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Summary
An economy skewed towards baby boomers and against millennials
The UK economy has become skewed. Rapid and sustained rises in house prices have 
concentrated wealth in the hands of those who own property. Far too many young 
people cannot afford homeownership and instead have to pay costly private rent. Life 
expectancy has risen faster than anticipated at a time when the large baby boomer 
cohort, born between 1945 and 1965, are reaching retirement. As the taxes of working 
people support the retired, the ageing population places strain on those in work. 
Pensioners have been protected from public spending cuts that have largely been 
felt by younger groups. Pensioner poverty has been drastically reduced and average 
pensioner household incomes now exceed those of non-pensioners after housing 
costs. The millennial generation, born between 1981 and 2000, faces being the first in 
modern times to be financially worse off than its predecessors.
The intergenerational contract
The welfare state has long been underpinned by an implicit social contract between 
generations. The provision of benefits and public services to the current pensioner 
population is funded by the taxes of the current working-age population. In turn they 
expect to receive similar benefits and services when they retire, and so on. The skewing 
of the welfare state has placed the intergenerational contract under strain.
Replacing the triple lock
The triple lock, which was introduced in 2012, annually uprates the state pension by 
whichever of price inflation, average earnings growth or 2.5 per cent is highest. It has 
made a valuable contribution in increasing the relative value of the state pension. Its 
retention would, however, tend to lead to state pension expenditure accounting for an 
ever greater share of national income. At a time when public finances are still fragile, 
this is unsustainable. Accelerated increases in the state pension age, an alternative 
means of making the state pension more fiscally sustainable, would disproportionately 
affect the young and those socio-economic groups with lower life expectancies in 
retirement. Allied to the introduction of the new state pension, which in future will 
see the vast majority of pensioners on a flat rate, the triple lock will by 2020 have 
achieved the Government’s objective of securing a decent minimum income for people 
in retirement to underpin private saving. The retention of the triple lock would not be 
intergenerationally fair. We urge political consensus before the next general election 
on a new earnings link for the state pension.
We recommend the Government benchmark the new state pension and basic state 
pension at the levels relative to average full-time earnings they reach in 2020. The 
triple lock should then be replaced by a smoothed earnings link. In periods when 
earnings lag behind price inflation, an above-earnings increase should be applied to 
protect pensioners against a reduction in the purchasing power of their state pension. 
Price indexation should continue when real earnings growth resumes until the state 
4  Intergenerational fairness 
pension reverts to its benchmark proportion of average earnings. Such a mechanism 
would enable pensioners to continue to share in the proceeds of economic growth, 
protect the state pension against inflation and ensure a firm foundation for private 
retirement saving. The new state pension and basic state pension it replaced would 
track average earnings growth in the long term. That is more fiscally sustainable and 
more intergenerationally fair.
Universal pensioner benefits
Universal pensioner benefits have been deployed by successive governments for 
reasons of short term expediency. Such measures, which do not tend to be subject to 
indexation, lead to ill-targeted support, further complicate the benefits system and 
are politically and administratively far harder to put right than to introduce in the 
first place. The Winter Fuel Payment is one such example. There is no case for future 
governments to contemplate any increase in the value or range of universal pensioner 
benefits. They should also not be off limits when spending priorities are set in future 
Parliaments.
Information gap
There is a dearth of reliable and comprehensive information about the intergenerational 
distribution of public and private resources. Greater awareness of the intergenerational 
implications of decisions would make for better informed policy. We recommend 
the Government make available the necessary information and resources to enable 
updated research estimating the balance of fiscal contributions and withdrawals by 
different generations over their entire lifetimes to be carried out.
Strengthening the intergenerational contract
The intergenerational fairness debate should not be conducted in divisive or adversarial 
terms. Each generation cares deeply about their children, parents and grandparents 
alike. It is not the fault of baby boomers that the economy, or certain asset prices, 
have become skewed in their favour. But the absence of fault does not obviate the need 
for policy action. The recommendations in this report are intended to strengthen the 
implicit contract between generations that is at the heart of our society.
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1 Introduction
The intergenerational contract
1. The welfare state has long been underpinned by an implicit social contract between 
generations.1 The provision of state pensions, benefits and public services to the current 
pensioner population is funded by the taxes of the current working-age population.2 
In turn they expect to receive similar benefits and services when they retire, and so on. 
This process of life cycle fiscal transfer has been allied to a widespread expectation that 
economic growth will enable each successive generation to enjoy gradually rising living 
standards.
2. Recent years have seen increasingly prominent concerns that shifts in the distribution 
of income and wealth, demographic trends and the policies of successive governments 
have placed the intergenerational contract under threat. Commentators such as Lord 
Willetts, a former Minister and Executive Chair of the Resolution Foundation,3 and 
the Intergenerational Foundation, a think tank founded in 2011, contend that the ‘baby 
boomer’ generation who are approaching or have recently reached retirement will, over 
the course of their lifetimes, enjoy greater provision of welfare and public services relative 
to their tax contribution than younger cohorts can hope to receive. At the same time as 
younger people face this fiscal pressure of supporting a growing pensioner population 
they are finding it increasingly difficult to buy a home or provide for their own retirement, 
concentrating wealth in older groups. Lord Willetts argues that the phenomenon of “a 
specific generation benefiting in an unrepeatable way” at the expense of its successors 
amounts to breaking the intergenerational contract and “storing problems for the future”.4
3. Survey evidence indicates that young adults are increasingly pessimistic about their 
chances of having a better life than their parents. As shown in Figure 1, those born in the 
1980s and 1990s, the ‘millennial’ generation, are least positive of all.
1 Intergenerational Foundation (IGF0010), Population Matters (IGF0022)
2 See, for example, SAGA (IGF0069), Dept for Work and Pensions (IGP0065)
3 David Willetts, The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children’s Future – and Why They Should Give It 
Back, 2010
4 David Willetts, “The social contract between generations in Britain is being broken”, Resolution Foundation 
website, 25 October 2015 
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Figure 1: Generational attitudes about the prospect of a better life than their parents
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Such concerns about the prospects for today’s young adults are not, however, restricted to 
that generation. Nearly two-thirds of baby boomers (those born in the 20 years following 
World War II) think that today’s youth are set to have a worse life than their parents.5 
While families may not think in terms of ‘generations’ and ‘contracts’, they naturally 
express concern for relatives of different ages.6 As Neil Duncan-Jordan of the National 
Pensioners Convention told us:
Pensioners are members of families. They are concerned about their children 
and grandchildren, just like the grandchildren are concerned about their 
grandparents.7
4. On becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May pledged to tackle the “growing divide 
between a more prosperous older generation and a struggling younger generation” as part 
of a “mission to make Britain a country that works for everyone”.8
Our inquiry
5. Assessing intergenerational fairness is not simply a matter of comparing the 
circumstances of different age groups at a given point in time, but instead the economic 
5 Ipsos MORI, Fragmented Times – Generational Strains, 2016 (published as part of the Ipsos MORI Generations 
project)
6 Academy of Social Sciences (IGF0032); Q18 [Lord Willetts]
7 Q81
8 Rt Hon Theresa May, Statement of 13 July 2016 and speech to launch Conservative leadership campaign, 11 July 
2016
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experiences of generations over the course of their lifetimes. We concur with the assessment 
of Rt Hon Steve Webb, former Minister for Pensions, who cautioned that a 60 year old who 
appeared relatively comfortable:
[ … ] was probably 20 when we had hyperinflation in the mid-1970s and 30 
when we had mass unemployment in the 1980s. If she is a woman, she may 
well have started work at a time when there was not even legislation to stop 
discrimination against women in the labour market. I think the challenge 
for the inquiry is to see people over the course of their whole lives and then 
I think you will get a rich and very different picture.9
Equally, intergenerational fairness should not be confused with very valid concerns about 
inequality within generations.
6. Intergenerational fairness encompasses welfare, pensions, housing, social care, higher 
education, economic and monetary policy, and so on. We have not sought to consider 
policy in all these areas, many of which stray beyond our remit. Instead, we have focused 
on the responsibilities of the Department for Work and Pensions in the context of broader 
economic and demographic trends. We are grateful to everyone who has contributed to 
the inquiry.
9 Q2
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2 The intergenerational contract under 
strain
Demographic context
A large and long-living baby boomer generation
7. Assessing intergenerational fairness must begin by defining different generations. 
This necessarily entails an element of arbitrary choice. Those born immediately before 
a generational dividing line may well dispute their implicit association with those born 
twenty years before but not those born one year later. A common approach is to define 
generations with reference to trends in birth rates, as shown in Figure 2. During the post-
war baby boom of 1946 to 1965, the children of which are now aged between 51 and 70, 
there were around 800,000 to one million UK births per year. In the ‘Generation X’ phase 
that followed, the UK went from ‘baby boom’ to ‘baby bust’–the number of births per 
year fell below 700,000 by the latter half of the 1970s. Subsequent generational phases are 
characterised by between 700,000 and 800,000 births in most years.
Figure 2: Number of births per year, United Kingdom
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of Scotland Births Time Series Data. Adapted from: Resolution Foundation Stagnation Generation, 18 July 2016
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8. The advent of a large baby boomer cohort has been accompanied by substantial rises 
in life expectancy. For example, a boy born in 1955, in the middle of the baby boom, had 
an 83 per cent chance of living to at least 65, compared with 45 per cent of those born in 
1895.10 An ever greater proportion of people are living deep into old age, as demonstrated 
by Figure 3:
Figure 3: Improving survival rates at age 50 and beyond, UK
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9. The combination of trends in birth rates and life expectancy will result in substantial 
change to the age structure of the UK population over the next 25 years. Figure 4 shows 
Office for National Statistics ‘population pyramids’ illustrating the UK’s age structure in 
2014 and 2039:
10 This is largely the culmination of a half century of massive progress in reducing infant mortality. Life expectancy 
is projected to continue increasing for subsequent generations due to improving survival rates at later ages - on 
current projections, boys born in 2015 are four times as likely as those born in 1955 to live to 100.
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Figure 4: Age structure of the UK population, mid-2014 and mid-2039
Source: ONS National Population Projections: 2014-based Statistical Bulletin
The share of the population aged 65 and over is projected to grow from 18 per cent in 2014 
to 24 per cent in 2039, while the proportion 80 and over is expected to grow from 5 per 
cent to 8 per cent over the same period. Increases will be proportionately highest in the 
oldest age groups.
10. The Intergenerational Foundation identified these demographic trends as an 
important driver of intergenerational imbalance:
The number of Baby Boomers and the unprecedented longevity which they 
are set to enjoy means they will require a bigger financial contribution from 
the next generation to support them in their old age than they provided 
for the generation which came before them, yet at the same time there is 
abundant evidence to suggest that today’s young workers are enduring a 
lower standard of living than today’s pensioners did when they were the 
same age [ … ].11
11 Intergenerational Foundation (IGF0010)
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Old-age dependency ratio
11. One measure of the extent to which the working age population supports pensioners 
is the dependency ratio, the number of pension age people per working age person. Figure 
5 shows projected trends in the dependency ratio, adjusted for changes in state pension age 
(SPA). The ratio was stable in the decade leading up to the mid-2000s, at which point the 
large baby-boomer cohort began the transition into pension age. Without the programme 
of SPA increases that began in 2010, the number of pensioners per 1,000 working-age 
people would have passed 400 by the middle of the next decade. Scheduled increases in 
the SPA until 2028 are projected to keep the dependency ratio at around 300 pension-age 
people per 1,000 working-age people. After then, a sharp rise to 375 per 1,000 is expected. 
The scheduled rise in the state pension age to 68 in 2044–46 then temporarily brings the 
ratio back down to 350 per 1,000, at which point it begins to increase again.
Figure 5: Crude dependency ratios for pensioners and children projected to 2060, UK
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12. The dependency ratio is a crude measure, as it does not assess the extent to which 
pensioners are truly dependent on financial transfers from their younger counterparts. As 
shown in Figure 6, the last 15 years have seen a substantial increase in the employment 
rate among those aged 65 and over, which has more than doubled from around 5 per cent 
in 2001 to over 10 per cent in 2016.12 This trend was apparently resistant to the 2008–09 
recession.
12 This should not simply be attributed to SPA increases, as the SPA is not scheduled to rise above 65 until 2018.
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Figure 6: Employment rates among people aged 65 and over, UK, 1992–2016
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13. Though the rise of the older worker blurs the distinction between working age and 
pension age, these employment rates remain far below those for younger age groups: 74 
per cent of the UK population aged 16–64 are in employment, rising to 84 percent of 
people aged 35–44. A further closing of that gap holds out the prospect of larger numbers 
of people in their late sixties and even seventies working and helping to shoulder the 
fiscal burden of an ageing population. Analysis by the Government Office for Science, 
however, shows that gains in healthy life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy 
at age 65 have not been keeping pace with the rises in overall life expectancy at that age. 
Average disability-free life expectancy remains below 65 in many areas of the country, 
constraining the ability of over-65s to prolong their working lives as SPA increases. 13
14. Demographic trends have placed considerable stress on the intergenerational 
contract. The post-war baby boomer cohort entering retirement is particularly large 
and people within it will tend to enjoy longer retirements than was anticipated. 
This puts a strain on the working age population. Increases in the state pension age 
reduce the ratio of pensioners to working age people and therefore have counteracted 
demographic trends. For many people, however, working into their late sixties or 
seventies is not an option.
13 Foresight/Government Office for Science Trends in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, March 2015, 
section 2.4, table 2 and section 3.2 table 6
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Private wealth
Homeownership and housing costs
15. Homeownership represents not just a major financial investment—for most people 
the largest they will ever make—but also a secure and stable basis to bring up a family, 
to live rent-free in retirement and ultimately pass a legacy to the next generation. A large 
majority of renters aged under 35, particularly those in the growing private rented sector, 
remain attached to the aspiration of ultimately owning their own home and expect to 
become homeowners at some point in the future.14 For many, however, rising house prices 
and rents have “dashed their justifiable expectation of an affordable home”.15 This is a 
particular concern in London and the South East, where house prices are highest and have 
tended to grow fastest.16 Generation Rent, a campaigning group, described the “hoarding” 
of property wealth by property speculators at the expense of would-be homeowners.17
16. The Resolution Foundation, a think tank, estimated that the time required for low 
to middle income households to save a deposit for a typical first time buyer purchase has 
increased from between three and five years during the 1980s and early 1990s to over 20 
years now.18 In the meantime, increasing numbers are renting privately or remaining in 
the parental home. James Sefton, Professor of Economics at Imperial College London, told 
us that “as the young’s main resource is their current and future labour income, whereas 
the old have a significant share of the wealth invested in real estate, implicit in this price 
appreciation is a large intergenerational transfer from young to old”.19
17. This overall pattern disguises a considerable degree of variation. Many of those baby 
boomers who own property may have suffered price falls and perhaps negative equity 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and may well have paid far higher interest rates than 
borrowers today.20 The Ready for Ageing Alliance cautioned that a quarter of people aged 
55–64 in England are renting while just under half fully own their property.21 Dan Wilson 
Craw of Generation Rent told us that people in middle age with little prospect of getting a 
mortgage were increasingly renting privately and having to claim housing benefit in work. 
This puts increasing strain on the housing benefit bill.22
18. There are, however, clear generational differences in homeownership. Research by 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), a think tank, shows how homeownership rates have 
declined in successive birth cohorts. Someone born in the mid-1960s, for example, had a 
45 per cent chance of owning a home aged 25. This fell to 34 per cent for the mid-1970s 
cohort and 21 per cent of those born in the mid-1980s. The rate has therefore halved in 
20 years. The difficulties in buying a home experienced by those born in the early 1980s 
contribute to such people being markedly less wealthy than the previous generation were at 
14 DCLG, English housing survey 2014 to 2015: first time buyers and potential home owners report, July 2016, 
annex table 2.3
15 Dr Jay Ginn (IGF0028)
16 Independent Age (IGF0048)
17 Generation Rent (IGF0059)
18 Q61 [Lord Willetts] and Corlett, Finch and Whittaker, Living Standards 2016: The experiences of low to middle 
income households in downturn and recovery, Resolution Foundation, 2016, pp40–41
19 Professor James Sefton (IGF0075)
20 Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (IGF0068)
21 Ready for Ageing Alliance (IGF0017)
22 Q111
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the same age. The IFS recently found that people in their early 30s have average household 
wealth per adult of £27,000—about half the average wealth holdings that people born in 
the 1970s had at the same age (£53,000).23
Figure 7: Homeownership rates by birth year and age
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19. Lord Willetts told us that the housing market is characterised by increasing 
proportions of renters and people who own their homes outright. The proportion who 
own with a mortgage, “the getting started bit”, is falling.24 The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(IFS) said that intergenerational effects could be compounded if house prices continued 
to rise:
The decline in homeownership rates might be thought a cause for concern 
in itself, but it also has the potential to affect the wealth accumulation 
of younger generations over their lifecycle if the (leveraged) returns on 
housing continue to exceed those on other assets, and younger generations 
are unable to access those returns.25
20. For those who do own a property its market value may in reality be secondary to its 
function as a family home.26 Steve Webb explained that realising increases in property 
values, through downsizing and equity release, was still rare.27 Ultimately, of course, 
the housing stock currently held by older generations must pass into the ownership of 
younger generations. The intergenerational transmission mechanism of property is, 
however, likely to be increasingly based on inheritance ever later in life, or in parental 
23 IFS, The Economic Circumstances of Different Generations: The Latest Picture, Briefing Note BN187, September 
2016, pages 2 and 9
24 Q55
25 Institute for Fiscal Studies (IGF0023)
26 Dr Jay Ginn (IGF0028)
27 Q26
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assistance to children in financing house purchases (the ‘bank of Mum and Dad’).28 This 
could exacerbate inequality of asset wealth within generations as those lacking parental 
financing or the prospect of an inheritance risk finding themselves permanently locked 
out of homeownership.29
21. We heard that acting to reduce the cost of housing could have a “transformative” 
effect, both on intergenerational fairness and on the wider performance of the economy.30 
Philip Booth, of the think tank the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), told us “there are 
not many things that are a silver bullet when it comes to policy but housing comes very close 
to that”.31 The proposed solutions focused on increasing the supply of housing, through 
an expansion of housebuilding, a relaxation of planning laws and making more efficient 
use of under-occupied housing.32 Ashley Seager, co-founder of the Intergenerational 
Foundation, advocated more innovative solutions, such as incentivising downsizing by 
the over-60s by removing stamp duty and adjusting the planning system to facilitate 
“downsizing-in-situ”, whereby a house is split into two flats and the occupier remains in 
one of them.33 These policy proposals lie outside the Work and Pensions remit, though 
should measures not be taken to increase the supply of housing the cost of housing benefit 
is likely to continue to increase.
22. Housing is central to intergenerational fairness. Rapid and sustained rises in 
house prices, most marked in London and its surrounding areas, have concentrated 
wealth in the hands of those who have owned property for decades. At the same time 
far too many young people have been priced out of homeownership. High private rents 
make it difficult to save for a deposit. The opportunities that were open to baby boomers 
to buy a home with a relatively small deposit are closed to today’s young. Though 
wealth will be passed to younger people through inheritance, this risks exacerbating 
inequality within generations. Successive governments have palpably failed to act 
effectively on the housing market. Alongside housebuilding, there is a strong case to 
consider innovative policies to encourage downsizing and to more efficiently distribute 
the existing stock. Such measures lie outside our remit. The manifest problems in the 
housing market, however, form the backdrop to much of this Report.
Savings and occupational pensions
23. Historically low interest rates and loose monetary policy since the 2008–09 recession 
have reduced returns on savings. Saga told us that this disproportionately affects older 
people, who are more likely to be dependent on savings income, while younger people 
with mortgages are benefitting from lower interest rates.34 Steve Webb emphasised that 
many current pensioners had been “stuffed” by very low annuity rates.35
24. Conversely, the relatively generous final-salary defined benefit (DB) pension schemes 
which were commonplace during the working lives of the baby boomer generation are 
now all but completely closed to new entrants. As a result, less than 10 per cent of private 
28 Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (IGF0068)
29 For example, United for All Ages (IGF0045), Grandparents Plus (IGF0058)
30 Q241 [Shiv Malik]
31 Q241
32 For example, Q230 [Shiv Malik], United for All Ages (IGF0045)
33 Q114
34 Saga (IGF0069)
35 Q31
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sector employees born in the early 1980s were active members of a DB scheme in their 
early 30s, compared with nearly 40 per cent of those born in the 1960s at the same age.36 
Younger workers now tend to be enrolled on defined contribution (DC) schemes instead.37 
These typically attract much lower levels of employer contribution: in 2015 the average 
employer contribution rate to private sector DC schemes was 2.5 per cent of pensionable 
earnings, compared to 16.2 per cent for DB schemes.38 DC schemes make no promise as to 
the value of the pension pot upon retirement, meaning that employees bear the full risk of 
investment performance.39 At the same time, the cost of servicing rapidly increasing DB 
scheme deficits—exacerbated by low investment returns—is placing an ever greater burden 
on UK firms. The Office for National Statistics estimates that in 2015 companies made 
special deficit repair contributions to DB schemes of £11 billion in addition to ordinary 
employer contributions of £20 billion.40 This may constrain their ability to increase 
employment or engage in productive investment.41 Today’s younger workers are therefore 
faced with supporting the inadequately-funded DB schemes of their older colleagues and 
retired predecessors, while being denied the opportunity to accrue pension entitlements 
on the same basis. Paul Johnson, Director of the IFS, told us that this was tantamount 
to a “very clear redistribution” between generations.42 Our ongoing inquiry into defined 
benefit pension schemes will consider intergenerational fairness in that context.43
Public expenditure and tax
Generational accounting
25. Public expenditure tends to be concentrated on younger and older age groups. 
Education expenditure is unsurprisingly skewed towards childhood while expenditure 
on health and social care is, on average, highest for the oldest people. Spending is lowest 
on working age people, the time when an individual’s tax contribution typically peaks. 
Figure 8 shows the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) model of such effects:
36 IFS, The Economic Circumstances of Different Generations: The Latest Picture, Briefing Note BN187, September 
2016, p13
37 For example Institute for Fiscal Studies (IGF0023)
38 ONS Occupational Pension Scheme Survey UK, 2015. The average contribution for career average schemes was 
12.9 per cent of pensionable earnings. The average employer contribution rate to DC schemes is set to rise as the 
rollout of automatic enrolment reaches completion, but this will only bring the minimum employer contribution 
rate up to 3 per cent by April 2019.
39 See, for example, ShareAction (IGF0050)
40 ONS Occupational Pension Scheme Survey UK, 2015. The Intergenerational Foundation estimated £35 billion of 
DB scheme special deficit repair contributions by a credible methodology. See Intergenerational Foundation, DB 
Pensions: Choking Hazard, June 2016.
41 Intergenerational Foundation, DB Pensions: Choking Hazard, June 2016
42 Q275
43 Pension Protection Fund and Pensions Regulator inquiry
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Figure 8: Representative profiles for tax, public services and welfare spending
9 
6 
3 
0 
Re
ce
ip
ts
/s
pe
nd
in
g 
in
 20
19
-2
0 
(£
 th
ou
sa
nd
) 
1 6 11
33 
Total spending 
30 
Education 
27 
Health 
24 
Long-term care 
21 
Tax 
18 
Welfare 
15 
12 
16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 101+ 
Age 
Source: OBR Fiscal sustainability report – June 2015
26. The Intergenerational Foundation argued that the primary function of the welfare 
state is to distribute resources across lifetimes, rather than between generations. Within 
each generation, fiscal contributions (tax receipts shown in red) and withdrawals (total 
spending shown in purple) should tend to balance.44 The alternative is one generation 
effectively subsidising another over the course of their respective lifetimes. Michael 
Johnson, of the think tank the Centre for Policy Studies, argued that the bill for the “vast 
unfunded promises” made to baby boomers, notably in state and public sector pensions, 
would have to be footed by the millennial generation.45
27. Generational accounting is a forward-looking assessment of the balance of fiscal 
contributions and withdrawals that people are set to make over their remaining lifetimes. 
Where this balance is negative, this implies a fiscal burden that current policies would, 
unchanged, impose on future generations.46 It also provides an indication of the policy 
reforms needed to achieve generational balance, in which future generations face the same 
lifetime net tax rates as current generations.47 The most recent UK Generational Accounts, 
published in 2011, estimated the intergenerational budget imbalance to be £7.6 trillion in 
aggregate terms. Future generations will, in effect, inherit net liabilities of just over five 
times annual GDP.48 The rise in tax revenue (or reduction in expenditure) needed to plug 
the gap would be around six per cent of GDP.
28. The 2011 UK Generational Accounts set out future contributions and withdrawals by 
age group. Without any changes in policy, children currently aged 0–4 would on average 
contribute around £70,000 more in taxes than they enjoyed in services and benefits. People 
currently aged 65–69 would on average have a net withdrawal of more than £220,000 
44 Intergenerational Foundation (IGF0010)
45 Michael Johnson, Who will care for generation Y?, Centre for Policy Studies, 2015
46 Cardarelli / Sefton / Kotlikoff, Generational Accounting in the UK, NIESR, April 1999
47 Cardarelli / Sefton / Kotlikoff, Generational Accounting in the UK, NIESR, April 1999
48 McCarthy / Sefton / Weale, Generational Account for the United Kingdom, NIESR Discussion Paper No. 377, 15 
March 2011, p.14. This figure comprises the £6.8 trillion present value of future net transfers (expenditures minus 
tax) to be paid by the government plus net government debt of £0.8 trillion.
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over the remainder of their lifetimes.49 In order to achieve fiscal balance by the end of 
today’s infants’ lifetimes, as yet unborn people would each need to contribute an average 
of £160,000 in net terms.50
Fiscal balances over lifetimes
29. Generational accounting only assesses the future profile of taxes and withdrawals 
for different generations over their remaining lifetimes. A complete life-cycle assessment 
would need to include past taxes paid and benefits received. The IFS argued that this 
would be “a more sensible tool for policy analysis”.51 The most prominent attempt to 
assess and compare the past and future contributions of different generations over the 
whole life course remains that published by Professor John Hills in 2004, based on 2001 
calculations.52 Professor Hills compared past and future tax contributions and expenditure 
on health, education and social security for each five-year birth cohort over the course of 
their lifetimes. His estimates are shown in Figure 9:
Figure 9: Projected lifetime receipts from health, education and social security, and taxes paid 
towards them by cohort
Born: Receipts Tax Net gain
1901-06 9.0 7.4 1.6 122 22
1906-11 9.6 8.3 1.3 116 16
1911-16 10.8 9.1 1.7 118 18
1916-21 11.9 10.3 1.6 115 15
1921-26 12.2 11.7 0.5 104 4
1926-31 13.7 13.5 0.2 102 2
1931-36 15.3 15.1 0.2 101 1
1936-41 16.7 15.7 1.0 107 7
1941-46 18.0 16.4 1.6 110 10
1946-51 18.6 17.0 1.6 110 10
1951-56 20.5 17.8 2.8 116 16
1956-61 21.6 18.3 3.3 118 18
1961-66 19.4 17.9 1.5 108 8
1966-71 18.5 18.1 0.4 102 2
1971-76 17.9 18.8 -0.9 95 -5
Cumulative receipts and 
payments, % of GDP
Receipts 
as % of tax 
paid
Source, J Hills (2004), 'Distribution and redistribution', chapter in Inequality and the State . Calculations based on actual spending patterns to 2001 and 
projections from 2001 to 2051. Takes no account of post-2001 policy changes to the profile of tax and spend.
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Sourc , J Hills ( 04), ‘Distributi n and redistributi n’, chapter in Inequality and the State. Calculations based on actual 
spending patterns to 2001 and projections from 2001 to 2051. Takes no account of post-2001 policy changes to the profile 
of tax and spend.
30. Professor Hills estimated that people born between 1951 and 1956 will receive in 
services 116 percent of what they contributed in tax, while people born between 1956 and 
1961 will receive 118 per cent.53 Lord Willetts used these data to argue that baby boomers 
“have received much more from the welfare state than they put in”.54 By contrast, the last 
49 ibid, table 2 (page 15). Expressed in net present value terms at 2008 prices.
50 Ibid, tables 1 & 3 and page 14
51 Banks et al, What can we learn about pension reform from Generational Accounts for the UK?: Institute for 
Fiscal Studies Working Paper W99/16, Oct 1999
52 John Hills, ‘Distribution and redistribution’, chapter 8 in Inequality and the State, OUP 2004; analysis reproduced 
in John Hills, Good Times Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us, Policy Press, 2015, ch. 13 fig 3.13.
53 David Willetts, The Pinch, 2010, p 162 - citing Hills, ‘Distribution and Redistribution’, p 199.
54 David Willetts/Resolution Foundation presentation, The pinch: How the baby boomers took their children’s 
future – and why they should give it back, 10 Dec 2015
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cohort Professor Hills analysed, those born between 1971 and 1976, were projected to be 
net contributors. This valuable research is now more than a decade old and does not take 
account of subsequent developments in the economy and government policy.
Benefit spending
31. As has long been the case, the majority of social security spending in Great Britain 
is directed towards pensioners.55 This in itself is not an indicator of intergenerational 
inequality in the distribution of government expenditure. In 2009–10, pensioners 
accounted for 52 per cent of total social security spending in Great Britain, rising to 55 per 
cent in 2016–17. This figure is projected to rise further, to 57 per cent by 2020–21, despite 
increases in the state pension age.
Figure 10: Welfare expenditure (incl. state pension, benefits and tax credits), Great Britain
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32. The relative decline in the non-pensioner share of expenditure is partly driven by 
increased rates of employment among working-age people. Policy choices have, however, 
also contributed. Measures affecting social security and tax credits announced since May 
2010 are estimated to have saved a total of £22 billion a year by 2015–16. These include 
a cap on working age benefit indexation, and cuts to child benefit, housing benefit and 
Universal Credit. The ongoing effect of these measures, combined with the further £12 
billion cuts to working age benefits legislated for in this Parliament, mean that total 
in-year savings are estimated to rise to £40 billion by 2020–21.56 These savings are almost 
entirely derived from cuts to working-age entitlements while pensioner benefits have been 
protected.57 Lord Willetts told us that per person by 2020, working-age benefits will be 9 
55 See DWP Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables 2016, GB Welfare table. Northern Ireland has devolved 
powers over social security but benefit rules and rates operate according to a principle of parity with Great 
Britain.
56 Welfare savings 2010–11 to 2020–21, House of Commons Library briefing paper CBP7667 
57 For example, Q74 [Ashley Seager]
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per cent lower, child benefits 12 per cent lower and pensioner benefits per pensioner 19 per 
cent higher compared with pre-crisis levels.58 We consider the state pension “triple lock” 
in the next chapter.
33. These savings do not include those from increases in the state pension age legislated 
for in the Pensions Acts 2011 and 2014. In 2014 the then Chancellor, George Osborne, 
described those changes as “bigger than any other saving I’ve made anywhere else in 
government”.59 Saga told us that, in total, they will reduce expenditure by £100 billion.60 
In annual terms, however, the savings are small relative to the cuts to working age benefits. 
For example, the state pension age increases in the Pensions Act 2011 will by 2020 save 
the DWP £4 billion per year (in 2011 prices) in spending and increase tax and national 
insurance receipts by £1 billion.61 Furthermore, future increases to the state pension age 
will only affect today’s working-age cohorts.
34. It is often argued that the focus on working-age welfare spending as a source of savings 
is at least in part motivated by political concerns about pensioners’ higher propensity to 
vote. Ashley Seager, for example, told us:
We think you only have to look at the adjustments that have happened since 
the financial crisis in terms of austerity, where benefits to those of working 
age and the young have been cut sharply but they have risen sharply for 
older generations—for the grey vote, if you like—and we think that should 
certainly stop, because it is progressively getting worse.62
Baroness Altmann, former Pensions Minister, among others cautioned that retired people 
are less able to increase their incomes in response to benefit reduction than working age 
people.63
35. After the substantial package of savings implemented in the last Parliament, it has 
proven increasingly difficult for the Government to make further cuts to working-age 
welfare. In late 2015 the Government scrapped plans announced in the 2015 Summer 
Budget to cut tax credits for working families in April 2016. This came after we urged 
a reconsideration of the proposal in light of the sudden and substantial reductions in 
income that they would have inflicted on large numbers of working families.64 Proposed 
changes to Personal Independence Payment (PIP, a disability benefit) assessment criteria 
58 Q7 [Lord Willetts]
59 BBC Andrew Marr Show 30 November 2014, cited by Age UK (IGF0044)
60 Saga (IGF0069). Based on: £30.6 billion total net reduction in DWP spend (2011–12 prices) over the period 
2016–2026, sourced from DWP Pensions Act 2011 impact assessment Annex A: State Pension Age (updated 21 
November 2011), page 8, table 3; and £73.5 billion total net reduction in DWP spend (in 2013–14 prices) over the 
period 2026–2036, sourced from DWP Pensions Act 2014 impact assessment Annex B: Long term State Pension 
sustainability: increasing the State Pension age to 67, page 9 table 2
61 DWP Pensions Act 2011 impact assessment Annex A: State Pension Age (updated 21 November 2011), page 8, 
tables 3 and 4
62 Q100 [Ashley Seager]
63 Baroness Altmann’s oral evidence to the Committee on 19 October 2016, Q3264. See also Institute of Economic 
Affairs (IGF0031).
64 Work and Pensions Committee, Third Report of Session 2015–16, A reconsideration of tax credit cuts, HC 548
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in relation to aids and appliances were also reversed in March 2016, just days after they 
were announced.65 The Government subsequently declared that there would be no further 
welfare savings measures in this Parliament beyond those already legislated for.66
36. More work is required to assess the intergenerational distribution of tax 
contributions and public spending on services and benefits. What research exists 
suggests that today’s young will be net contributors to the welfare state, while the baby 
boomer generation will be net beneficiaries. The effect is likely to have been exacerbated 
by policy decisions to protect pensioner benefits while targeting welfare cuts on working 
age payments. The limits of that approach have been reached. If further measures are 
needed to ensure the fiscal sustainability of welfare spending in the medium to long 
term then pensioner expenditure should not remain out of bounds.
Incomes and poverty
37. The UK had a crisis of pensioner poverty. By the end of the 1980s, pensioners were 
around twice as likely as the population as a whole to live in relative poverty—over 
two-fifths lived in households with incomes 60 per cent below the median. Figure 11 
shows the remarkable turnaround in the quarter-century since then. Before housing costs 
are taken into account, pensioners are now no more likely to be living in relative poverty 
than the population as a whole. After housing costs are taken into account, the percentage 
of pensioners living in relative poverty (14 per cent) is substantially lower than working-
age adults (21 per cent) and children (29 per cent).
Figure 11: Percentage of individuals in relative low income (below 60% of contemporary median 
net income)
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38. The last quarter-century has also seen a vast improvement in average pensioner 
incomes relative to non-pensioners (see Figure 12). After housing costs are deducted 
and adjusting for household composition, median pensioners household net incomes 
are now estimated to be just above the working-age average, having been below 70 per 
65 Letter from the Prime Minister to Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP, 18 March 2016
66 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions statement on not going ahead with changes to Personal Independence 
Payment, HC Deb 21 Mar 2016 col 1268
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cent of the working-age median in the late 1980s. Shiv Malik, a journalist specialising in 
intergenerational issues, noted “pensioners take home more from not working as people 
who do work, which is an astounding proposition.”67
39. Increases in pensioner income have been driven mainly by real increases in the value 
of their benefits and state pensions, higher incomes from private pensions, and increased 
employment rates. The rate of ‘catch-up’ was particularly fast during periods of recession, 
as the negative impact on earnings was mainly felt by working-age households. 68
Figure 12: Median equivalised household income of pensioners relative to non-pensioners since 
1979 (GB)
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Source: IFS (Belfield et al) Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in the UK: 2015, fig 3.6
Shiv Malik described the relative rise of pensioner incomes as “the greatest mitigation 
of poverty since the creation of the middle classes in the developed world”.69 This is, of 
course, to be celebrated. Mr Malik cautioned, however, that “if it is coming at the cost of 
the next generation then we have problems”, particularly as economic and welfare sys-
tems tended to be built on the implicit premise that the next generation would be better 
off than the last.70
40. Reductions in incomes associated with the 2008–09 recession have been felt 
particularly acutely by the ‘millennials’, who constitute the youngest segment of the 
workforce. IFS analysis shows that in 2014–15 the real median income of the 22 to 30 
age group was still 7 per cent below its 2007–08 level whereas for 31 to 59 year olds the 
median income had recovered to its pre-recession peak and for those aged 60 and over 
incomes were 11 per cent higher in real-terms.71 The IFS also found that average incomes 
of those born in the early 1980s are slightly lower than those of the 1970s cohort at the 
same age - the first time for at least 50 years that a cohort has begun their working-age 
67 Q252 [Shiv Malik]
68 IFS, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2016, pp 14 and 21
69 Q237 [Shiv Malik]
70 Q237 [Shiv Malik]
71 IFS, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2016, pp 3 and 12. See also Resolution Foundation, 
Stagnation Generation, 2016, pp 10–11
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lives with average incomes no higher than those of their predecessors.72 The Resolution 
Foundation found that millennials are “the first generation that has so far earned less than 
the one before at every age” and that if productivity growth remains low, “millennials are 
at risk of becoming the first ever generation to record lower lifetime earnings than their 
predecessors”.73 Even optimistic assumptions suggest that “millennials will record much 
lower generational pay progress than their predecessor generations did”.74
41. Great strides against the scourge of pensioner poverty have been made over the 
past 25 years. After housing costs, pensioner households are far less likely to be in 
poverty than households of working age, particularly those with children. Pensioner 
incomes have also rapidly caught up those of other households. This is a triumph. This 
success, however, has implications for policy. This is particularly true at a time when 
people in their 20s and 30s may struggle to attain—never mind exceed—the incomes 
of their forebears.
42. The economy has become skewed in favour of baby boomers and against millennials. 
Unless governments adapt to these changed circumstances the intergenerational 
contract that underpins the welfare state is under threat.
72 IFS, The Economic Circumstances of Different Generations: The Latest Picture, Briefing Note BN187, Sep 2016, 
p6. There is some contradictory evidence - ONS data shows that median equivalised disposable income in 
households in which the chief economic supporter is aged 20–29 was 34% higher in real terms in 2014–15 than 
in 1994–95. However, the same measure rose by 63% for the 60+ age group. See ONS Bespoke analysis of Effects 
of Taxes and Benefits on Household Income, 10 October 2016.
73 Resolution Foundation, Stagnation Generation, 2016, pp 10–11
74 Resolution Foundation, Stagnation Generation, 2016, pp 5–6
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3 The state pension triple lock
State pension uprating policy and its effects
43. The ‘triple lock’ or ‘triple guarantee’ was announced by the Coalition Government in 
the June 2010 Budget75 and implemented in 2012. It uprates the basic state pension (BSP) 
annually by the highest of:
• price inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI);
• average earnings growth; or
• 2.5 per cent. 76
The triple lock also applies to the new state pension (NSP), which was introduced for 
people reaching state pension age from 6 April 2016.77 The Government confirmed its 
commitment to retaining the triple lock until 2020 in the June 2015 Budget.78
44. An earlier statutory link between the BSP and earnings was removed by the Social 
Security Act 1980.79 It was restored by the Pensions Act 2007 and came into effect in 2010.80 
This followed the 2005 Pensions Commission recommendation that restoration of the link 
was required to “stop the spread of means testing which would occur if present indexation 
arrangements were continued indefinitely”. Means testing undermined incentives to save 
privately and therefore the prospect of people saving adequately for retirement.81 In the 
interim period, the BSP was uprated in line with the Retail Prices Index (RPI), a further 
measure of price inflation. This indexation was supplemented in 2001 by a minimum 
annual increase of 2.5 per cent.82 This followed controversy over a 75p increase in the 
weekly pension prompted by low inflation in 1999.83
75 HC Deb 22 June 2010, vol 512 cols 166–80 [Budget statement]
76 In the legacy state pension system (which applies to those who reached state pension age before 6 April 2016), 
the triple lock only applies to the Basic pension while the additional State Pension (SERPS/S2P) is raised in line 
with CPI inflation.
77 HL Deb 28 April 2016 col 1235 [Lords Chamber]
78 HM Treasury, Summer Budget 2015, 8 July 2015, HC (2015–16) 264; 
79 Social Security Act 1980, section 1 amended section 125 of the Social Security Act 1975 to link long-term benefit 
increases to prices, not earnings.
80 Social Security Administration Act 1992, s150A - inserted by Pensions Act 2007 s5(1), which restored the earnings 
link, and amended by Pensions Act 2014 which introduced the new State Pension.
81 Pensions Commission, A New Pension Settlement for the Twenty-First Century, Second Report, November 2005, 
Executive summary, page 10–12.
82 HC Deb 27 November 2001, cols 836–7 [Pre-Budget Report statement]
83 State Pension Uprating, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper SN-05649, 31 Aug 2016, para 2.1
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Figure 13: Trends in the state pension compared to earnings
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45. Figure 13 shows trends in the BSP and NSP relative to average earnings. As prices 
tend to rise more slowly than earnings, the value of the BSP declined relative to average 
earnings during the period of price indexation. The BSP was 26 per cent of mean full-time 
earnings in 1979, falling to 16 per cent in the period 2000–2008.
46. A combination of economic factors and policy changes in recent years have resulted 
in the state pension making up much of the ground it had lost relative to earnings during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Historically, earnings growth has tended to exceed both inflation and 
2.5 per cent. This was not, however, the case in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Exceptional economic circumstances resulted in the BSP increasing relative to average 
earnings at a rate that would not have been anticipated when either uprating regime was 
instigated. Steve Webb described the rapid growth in the state pension relative to earnings 
as a “windfall”, as his concern as Pensions Minister had been that such progress would 
be “glacial”.84 RPI exceeded average earnings for the purposes of state pension uprating 
in 2008–09, 2009–10 and 2011–12. In the intervening year, the Government applied a 
discretionary increase of 2.5 per cent,85 which exceed average earning growth and both 
measures of inflation. With the triple lock then in place, the BSP increased by more than 
average earnings in each year from 2012–13 to 2015–16 as either CPI inflation or 2.5 per 
cent exceeded earnings growth (figure 14). As a consequence of these combined increases 
the BSP is expected to be 18.6 per cent of average full-time earnings in 2016–17, a level not 
seen since the 1980s.
47. The full rate of the NSP is currently £155.65, substantially higher than the BSP at 
approximately 24 per cent of average full-time weekly earnings.86 This percentage is near 
the peak of the BSP’s value relative to average earnings (26 per cent in 1979). Under the 
triple lock, the NSP will still be worth at least 24 per cent of average full-time earnings by 
84 Q4 [Steve Webb]
85 This discretionary increase was announced in the 2009 Pre-Budget Report (HC Deb 9 Dec 2009 col 362).
86 Based on average full-time weekly earnings of £627.40 as at April 2015 (source ONS Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings 2015 provisional results table 1), increased in line with average earnings growth of 2.4% in 2015/16 as 
forecast by OBR (March 2016 Economic and Fiscal Outlook)
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the end of this Parliament (see figure 13). In time, the vast majority of new pensioners—
between 80 and 90 per cent—will receive the full rate of NSP, which will place their incomes 
above the threshold for the means tested Pension Credit guarantee (currently £155.60).87 
When asked whether the state pension is still too low, Baroness Altmann told us it:
is now recovering to a level that is decent and the new state pension on 
top of this will provide a good base for people to make their own private 
provision on top. That is the purpose of the policy.88
Now the former Pensions Minister, she argued recently that “the triple lock will have 
fulfilled its purpose by 2020”.89
48. The triple lock, allied to the introduction of the flat rate new state pension, has 
succeeded in increasing the value of the headline state pension relative to average 
earnings to a level not seen since the original earnings link was removed in 1980. 
Low rates of earnings growth following the 2008–09 recession mean this process has 
occurred faster than was expected. Provided the new state pension is maintained at 
this proportion of earnings the work of the triple lock, to secure a decent minimum 
income for people in retirement to underpin private saving, will have been achieved.
Sustainability of the triple lock
The ratchet effect
49. As the state pension rises each year by the highest of three factors, it is structurally 
more generous than its individual components. It sets the state pension on a permanently 
divergent upward trajectory relative to both earnings and prices. Lord Willetts described 
this as a ratchet effect:
It really is a ratchet, where regardless of the state of the economy, regardless 
of what is happening to other groups’ earnings and incomes, the pension 
just rises substantially.
50. The charts below show the effect of the triple lock since it was first applied in respect 
of 2012–13 state pension rates. The BSP was uprated in line with CPI in 2012 –13 and 2014–
15, earnings growth in 2016–17 and the 2.5 per cent minimum in 2013–14 and 2015–16 
(figure 14).
87 New State Pension: impact on an individual’s pension entitlement – longer term effects, DWP ad hoc research, 
14 January 2016, p 16
88 Q295
89 “Triple lock for state pensions could move to a double lock”, Baroness Altmann, pensionsandsavings.com blog, 
30 July 2016
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Figure 14: Indexation factors applicable to fiscal years 2012–13 to 2021–22
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On current forecasts, the triple lock will result in the basic state pension being worth 
nearly seven per cent more than it would have been under a simple earnings link by the 
end of this Parliament (figure 15). It will be worth nearly 4 per cent more than if the 
previous system of RPI indexation had applied over the period.
Figure 15: Indexation trajectories for basic state pension from 2011–12 onwards
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51. Reform, a think tank, estimated that the triple lock will in 2016 result in annual state 
pension expenditure £4.5 billion higher than it would have been had a simple earnings 
link been in place.90 This gap can only grow. The most recent OBR projection of the long-
term impact of the triple lock on state pension expenditure was contained in its 2015 
Fiscal Sustainability Report. Given that in some years earnings growth is expected to fall 
below the rate of price inflation or the 2.5 per cent minimum, the OBR estimated that the 
90 William Mosseri-Marlio, “Cost of the triple lock is set to surpass £20 billion”, Reform, 28 October 2016
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triple lock delivers an average annual increase of 4.9 per cent in the long term. That is 0.39 
percentage points higher than average annual earnings growth (4.5 per cent) and 2.89 
percentage points higher than CPI inflation (assumed in the long term to be 2.0 per cent 
in line with the Bank of England’s target).91 Based on this assumption, the OBR estimated 
that:
• the annual cost of the triple lock relative to earnings uprating will be an 
additional 1.3 per cent of GDP by 2064–65 (the gap between red and green lines 
in figure 16);
• if the state pension were just earnings-linked rather than triple-locked, spending 
on this would be kept within a range of 6—6.25 per cent of GDP, thanks also to 
planned increases in the state pension age; and
• on the current legislated state pension age timetable, i.e. without further 
longevity-linked increases in the state pension age, state pension expenditure 
would rise to 8 per cent of GDP by the mid-2060s.92
Figure 16: OBR projections of state pension expenditure, % of GDP
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52. The long-term effect of the triple lock ratchet on state pension expenditure was the 
backdrop for many commentators calling for its abandonment. The IEA said it had “little 
economic justification” and created “an ever-inflating cost dynamic for the state pension”. 
93 Philip Booth added “it is crazy to have a system by which the pension rises by the 
greater of three different figures and it just leads to a totally arbitrary level of the state 
pension”.94 Baroness Altmann argued that the 2.5 per cent minimum annual increase 
91 OBR Fiscal Sustainability Report June 2015, table 3.4, p 63. The 2016 FSR publication has been cancelled in the 
wake of the EU Referendum.
92 OBR Fiscal Sustainability Report June 2015 pp 72–73
93 Institute of Economic Affairs (IGF0031) 
94 Q231 [Philip Booth]
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was “arbitrary” and had “no specific relationship to society or the economy”.95 The IFS 
concurred, noting it applied “regardless of changes in meaningful economic variables like 
earnings and prices”.96 Its Director, Paul Johnson, said the triple lock:
adds £15bn to costs by 2050 relative to earnings indexation; introduces an 
element of pure randomness into the pension level [and] makes no sense as 
a policy.97
The IFS summarised that the triple lock is not sustainable indefinitely and that “there is 
no plausible objective to which the triple-lock is the best solution”.98
53. The Intergenerational Foundation argued against the triple lock on grounds of 
intergenerational fairness:
From an equity standpoint, it makes sense to uprate the BSP in line with 
either inflation (to maintain its purchasing power) or earnings (so that it 
increases at the same rate as the working population’s capacity to pay for it), 
but increasing it by more than either of these measures is unfair, especially 
at a time when many working-age benefits have been either frozen or 
indexed by less than the value of inflation.99
Professor James Sefton added that the triple lock prevents “intergenerational risk sharing” 
in the event of shocks to the economy.100 It shares increased prosperity but concentrates 
the costs of an economic crisis on younger groups.
54. The triple lock is inherently unsustainable. In the absence of reform the state 
pension would inevitably grow at a faster rate than the rewards of work and would 
account for an ever-greater share of national income. In particular, we find no objective 
justification for the 2.5 per cent minimum increase.
State pension age increases
55. As was demonstrated by OBR analysis, if the triple lock is to be maintained then the 
long-run sustainability of state pension expenditure will be dependent on further increases 
in the state pension age. The state pension age for men and women is currently scheduled 
to rise to 67 by 2028 (affecting those currently aged 38–54) and to 68 by 2046 (affecting 
those currently aged under 38). The Pensions Act 2014 provides for periodic longevity-
based reviews of the state pension age.101 The first such review, led by John Cridland, will 
report in early 2017. The ‘guiding principle’ of these reviews is to maintain the proportion 
of adult life spent in receipt of a state pension at no more than a third. This means that, 
on the basis of current projections, “the increase in the state pension age to 68 is likely to 
come forward from the current date of 2046 to the mid-2030s, and that the state pension 
95 Baroness Altmann, Triple lock for state pensions could move to a double lock, pensionsandsavings.com blog, 
published 30 July 2016; “Government to keep the triple lock on state pension until 2020,” Financial Times, 31 
July 2016
96 Institute for Fiscal Studies (IGF0023)
97 “Pension policy – where have we been, where are we going?” Presentation by Paul Johnson, Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 20 October 2015
98 Institute for Fiscal Studies (IGF0023)
99 Intergenerational Foundation (IGF0010)
100 Qq 2 6, 272 [James Sefton]
101 Pensions Act 2014, section 27
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age is likely to increase further to 69 by the late 2040s”.102 Even with SPA increases along 
these lines, however, the OBR projects that expenditure on the triple-locked state pension 
will continue to rise markedly as a share of GDP.103
56. Steve Webb, who introduced the triple lock as Pensions Minister, defended its long-
term viability by arguing that it should be viewed not in isolation but as part of a package 
of structural changes to the state pension system. The new state pension, he said, acted 
to “strip out long-term cost pressures from the system.”104 The new state pension is 
contributory but people cannot accumulate more entitlement than the full flat rate for 
which 35 qualifying years of national insurance contributions or credits are required. 
Someone who leaves school at 18 may have a working life of 50 years or more, but further 
contributions will not result in higher pensions. Steve Webb acknowledged, “today’s 
teenagers will be lucky to get a pension before they reach the age of 70”.105 In summary, he 
described his state pension policy as “we will not pay you a pension until a much later age 
[ … ] but when you get it, it will be worth having”.106
57. Age UK similarly defended the triple lock as being of long-term benefit to today’s 
younger generations:
During retirement, most other parts of income such as private pensions and 
annuity income, are likely to fall in real terms. The triple lock will ensure 
that at least one element of retirement income maintains its value over time.107
The Pensions Policy Institute noted that the triple lock greatly increases the probability 
of today’s younger workers achieving income replacement ratios in retirement that 
adequately maintain their living standards.108
58. We heard concerns, however, that the trade-off of an ever higher state pension age to 
compensate for generous uprating disadvantaged certain groups. Baroness Altmann said:
Many low earners, people in heavy industrial jobs, those living in particular 
areas of the country have much lower life expectancy than average. These 
significant variations in life expectancy mean that continually increasing 
state pension age will further disadvantage particular groups of society.109
In its interim report, the state pension age review considered some of these points. It found 
significant geographical differences in life expectancy. For example, life expectancy at 
birth in Greater London is 2.6 years higher for women and 2.4 years higher for men than 
in Greater Manchester. There are, however, even wider differentials between local areas 
within those urban areas, as shown in figure 17, which is based on transport networks:110
102 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, paras 1.119–1.125; see also Autumn Statement 
announcement on a core principle underpinning future State Pension age rises: DWP background note 
December 2013
103 OBR Fiscal Sustainability Report June 2015, para 3.56 and chart 3.7
104 Steve Webb, “Yes, pensioners have never had it so good – but they still deserve the ‘triple lock’”, Telegraph, 22 
Oct 2015. See also Work and Pensions Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2015–16, Communication of the new 
State Pension, HC 926, para 29
105 As above
106 Q5 [Steve Webb]
107 Age UK (IGF0044)
108 Pensions Policy Institute (IGF0055)
109 Baroness Altmann, “Triple lock for state pensions could move to a double lock,” pensionsandsavings.com blog, 
30 July 2016
110 Independent Review of the State Pension Age: interim report, 13 October 2016, p 57
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Figure 17: Resident male life expectancy at birth by public transport stops
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59. The state pension age review also found significant differences in life expectancy 
by local deprivation levels and socio-economic group. For example, life expectancy at 
birth was 5.9 years higher for men and 4.4 years higher for women in the managerial 
and professional classification than for those in routine occupations.111 People living 
in deprived areas or in lower socio-economic groups tend to spend far fewer years in 
retirement than their affluent peers and are less likely to be healthy in that retirement.112 
People who leave school in their teens may well also contribute more years of work than 
their university-educated peers for no higher new state pension. The review has invited 
responses on whether the state pension age is the appropriate mechanism for ensuring the 
fiscal sustainability of the state pension.113
60. There is, to some extent, a trade-off between the uprating of the state pension 
and the state pension age. The cost of a more generous state pension can be offset by 
restricting its availability to fewer people. Increases in the state pension age, however, 
disproportionately affect younger people. They also risk further skewing receipt of the 
state pension towards people in areas of the country, and socio-economic groups, in 
which life expectancy is high. People with low life expectancies, who may have been 
disadvantaged in their early years and working lives, would be further disadvantaged 
in their later years. We do not doubt that further increases in the state pension age 
will be required as welcome increases in life expectancy continue. They should not, 
111 Independent review of the State Pension age: interim report, 13 October 2016, pp 58–60. Figures related to 
England and Wales.
112 Independent review of the State Pension age: interim report, 13 October 2016, pp 61–66
113 Independent review of the State Pension age: interim report, 13 October 2016, p 93
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however, be the sole means of ensuring the long-term affordability of the state pension. 
We welcome the wide-ranging approach the ongoing review of the state pension age 
has taken to its work.
Alternatives to the triple lock
Removing one of the elements of the triple lock
61. The IEA argued that a return to price-indexation of the state pension would be 
“particularly helpful” to achieving fiscal sustainability.114 Saga identified the earnings 
component of the triple lock as “potentially problematic” on the grounds that “should 
earnings shoot up in future the triple-lock will prove unsustainable”. It suggested that the 
triple lock could be replaced by a link to a pensioner-specific price index, underpinned by 
a 2.5 per cent minimum increase.115
62. We heard however that an earnings link was important not only to enable state 
pensioners to share in rising prosperity, but to incentivise private saving. The full rate of 
the NSP is currently set just above the level of the means tested Pension Credit standard 
income guarantee, which is itself subject to statutory earnings uprating.116 In announcing 
the NSP in 2013, the then Government said it would “simplify the state pension and better 
support saving for retirement”.117 The DWP estimates that by 2030 the NSP system will 
reduce eligibility for Pension Credit guarantee credit by nearly a third for new pensioners 
compared with the legacy system.118 If the new state pension were to lag behind earnings, 
it would soon fall below guarantee credit level, making increasing numbers eligible for 
a means tested top-up. This would erode the incentive for additional pension saving, 
undermining the central purpose of the reform.119 In our Report on pensions automatic 
enrolment we concluded that the Government should consider means of promoting 
further private saving to ensure more people had adequate incomes for retirement.120
63. Baroness Altmann argued for the abandonment of the “arbitrary” 2.5 per cent 
minimum increase from 2020, making the triple lock a “double lock” with the state 
pension being increased by the higher of prices and earnings growth in any given year. 
This, she argued, would protect pensioner incomes while delivering “billions of pounds 
lower long-term pension costs”. She added that governments could still opt to apply a 
higher discretionary increase in an individual year if circumstances dictated.121
64. Andrew Hood of the IFS cautioned, however, that a double locked pension would still 
tend to account for an ever great share of national income:
If you took the 2.5% out of the triple lock and said the state pension will rise 
with the higher prices and earnings, you still have the problem that over 
the long run it would rise faster than both. During the recession it would 
114 Institute of Economic Affairs (IGF0031)
115 Saga (IGF0069)
116 Social Security Administration Act 1992 section 150, as amended by Pensions Act 2007 section 5
117 Department for Work and Pensions, 2013, The single-tier pension: A simple foundation for saving, CM 8528
118 New State Pension: impact on an individual’s pension entitlement – longer term effects, DWP ad hoc research, 
14 January 2016, figure 12, page 26
119 TUC (IGF0042), para 5.4
120 Work and Pensions Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2015–16, Automatic enrolment, HC 579
121 Baroness Altmann, “Triple lock for state pensions could move to a double lock,” pensionsandsavings.com blog, 
30 July 2016; “Government to keep the triple lock on state pension until 2020”, Financial Times, 31 July 2016
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have risen in line with prices, therefore becoming a higher share of average 
earnings, and then because it goes up in line with average earnings after 
that, that has now got baked in, it has got locked in.
Smoothed earnings link
65. The IFS suggested an alternative system which would ensure that growth in the state 
pension:
• did not fall behind earnings (as it would with price indexation);
• protected pensioners from real cuts to income in periods when real earnings fall 
(as would occur with straightforward earnings indexation); and
• did not exceed growth in earnings in the long-term.
That combination of policy objectives could be achieved by linking the state pension to a 
fixed minimum proportion of average earnings, a system in operation in Australia. The 
state pension would be uprated with earnings, but with temporary price-indexation when 
inflation exceeded wage growth. Price indexation would continue once earnings growth 
again exceeded inflation, but only for as long as the value of the state pension remained 
above the original fixed minimum proportion of average earnings. Indexation would then 
revert to earnings.122 Pensioners would not be hit with real falls in income, but the state 
pension would not rise ever higher relative to earnings. Andrew Hood of the IFS told us, 
therefore, that “you can have your cake and eat it”.123
66. Figure 18 illustrates how an ‘Australian-style’ smoothed earnings uprating 
mechanism might work compared to other indexation methodologies. It shows a notional 
30-year period during which average earnings grow twice as fast as prices in most years 
but each decade is punctuated by a brief period of below-inflation earnings growth, as 
might occur in a recession. The double lock is slightly less generous than the triple lock 
in the long run, as there is no fixed minimum increase of 2.5 per cent. While offering 
transitional protection during the recession periods, an Australian-style uprating system 
is less generous still, tracking earnings growth in the long run. In doing so, it would avoid 
the structurally higher long-term costs associated with a triple lock or double lock.124
122 Pension policy – where have we been, where are we going?, IFS presentation, 20 Oct 2015; see also Pensions and 
living standards and the public debate, IFS, 22 Oct 2015
123 Q287 [Andrew Hood]
124 The Australian Age Pension differs from the UK State Pension in that it is means tested and eligibility is based 
on years of residence rather than contribution record. The Age Pension for a couple is currently benchmarked 
at 41.76 per cent of male total average weekly earnings whereas the single person rate is 66.3 per cent of the 
couple rate (27.7 per cent of average male earnings). Source: Australian Dept of Social Services and Australian 
Parliamentary Library Research Papers Pension indexation: a brief history (April 2014)
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Figure 18: Illustration of different indexation trajectories over 30 years
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67. The triple lock should not continue beyond 2020. By then, the value of the new state 
pension relative to average earnings will be close to the historic high for the headline 
state pension rate. If maintained, the arbitrary boost the triple lock gives to the state 
pension relative to both earnings and prices will become ever harder to justify both in 
fiscal terms and from the perspective of intergenerational fairness. We urge political 
consensus before the next general election on a new earnings link for the state pension.
68. We recommend the Government benchmark the new state pension and basic state 
pension at the levels relative to average full-time earnings they reach in 2020. The triple 
lock should then be replaced by an earnings link. In periods when earnings lag behind 
price inflation, an above-earnings increase should be applied to protect pensioners 
against a reduction in the purchasing power of their state pension. Price indexation 
should continue when real earnings growth resumes until the state pension reverts to its 
benchmark proportion of average earnings. Such a mechanism would enable pensioners 
to continue to share in the proceeds of economic growth, protect the state pension 
against inflation and ensure a firm foundation for private retirement saving. The new 
state pension and basic state pension it replaced would track average earnings growth 
in the long term. That is more fiscally sustainable and more intergenerationally fair.
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4 Universal pensioner benefits
69. ‘Universal’ benefits are available to a whole section of the population as of right, 
without the imposition of a means test, national insurance contribution requirements or 
other restrictive criteria. Universality has largely disappeared from working age benefits. 
As part of the welfare reforms in the last Parliament, child benefit, which was the main 
universal cash benefit available to all families with dependent children, became subject 
to a high-income tax charge. 125 Pensioners, however, continue to benefit from a range of 
cash and in-kind universal benefits:
• Cash benefits:
Ȥ Winter Fuel Payment (DWP; introduced in 1997); and
Ȥ £10 Christmas bonus (DWP; introduced in 1972).126
• Non-cash benefits (benefits-in-kind):
Ȥ free TV licences for those aged 75 and over (introduced in 2000, subsidy 
financed by DWP);
Ȥ free prescriptions and eye tests for those aged 60 and over in England 
(Department of Health);127 and
Ȥ a statutory concessionary travel scheme providing free off-peak bus travel 
in England to people aged above the female state pension age (since 2006, 
Department for Transport).128
70. Free TV licenses for people aged 75 and over will cost the DWP £630 million this 
year—0.3 per cent of total welfare spending in Great Britain, and 0.6 per cent of DWP 
spend on pensioners. However, as part of the BBC’s latest funding settlement, this cost 
will begin to be passed from the DWP to the BBC from 2018–19, with the BBC taking on 
full responsibility in 2020–21. This leaves the Winter Fuel Payment as the main universal 
benefit that the DWP provides.
Political considerations
71. Lord Willetts and Steve Webb told us of the particular sensitivities around any 
proposal to reform pensioner entitlements, even in respect of relatively minor elements 
such as the 25p-a-week state pension addition for those aged 80 and over.129 Steve Webb 
said:
I did want to get rid of the 25p addition, because I used to get letters every 
week saying how absurd it was. I had two options. One was to level up and 
put another 25p on the under-80s pension, and the answer was, “We have 
125 Local Government Association (IGF0039)
126 HC Deb 14 November 1972 vol 846 c53W [Retirement Pensioner (Bonus)]. The Christmas Bonus is effectively 
universal for pensioners as it payable to all State Pensions and recipients of Pension Credit guarantee credit.
127 Prescriptions are free of charge to everyone in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Free eye examinations are 
available to UK citizens of all ages in Scotland.
128 Concessionary bus fares, House of Commons Library briefing paper SN01499
129 Qq 36- 8
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no money. We are trying to save billions over here” and the other was to 
abolish it, which generates the headline, “Skinflint Minister takes pennies 
off elderly pensioners” and it just felt—like all my 27 predecessors—not 
worth the bother.130
72. Mr Webb added “what tends to happen with these things is they come in as a 
gimmick, they stay and get eroded and eroded.”131 The £10 Christmas bonus is a case in 
point. When first introduced in December 1972, it was worth more than a week’s basic 
state pension for an individual (£6.75) and almost as much as the married couple’s rate 
(£10.90).132 Since then the Christmas bonus payment has been frozen in cash terms at £10 
and not uprated in line with inflation. As a result, its real annual cost to the Exchequer 
has fallen by nearly 90 per cent since its introduction (from £870m to £124m in 2016–17 
prices), despite the number of pensioner recipients having increased by over 50 per cent 
over the same period.133
73. The preservation of universal pensioner benefits was a matter of cross-party 
consensus at the 2010 General Election. The 2010 Coalition Agreement pledged to protect 
them during the 2010–2015 Parliament at the same time as introducing restrictions to 
working-age benefits and tax credits. These pensioner benefits continue to be protected 
in this Parliament, in accordance with the Conservative manifesto pledge. Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats made similar pledges with the exception of proposals to withdraw 
Winter Fuel Payment from higher-rate taxpayers which would have affected only around 
5 per cent of the eligible population.134
The Winter Fuel Payment
74. Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) is a tax-free, non-means tested annual payment paid to 
people aged over the female state pension age. Recipients are not obliged to spend it on 
fuel. The standard rates are £200 per eligible household where the oldest person is under 
80 and £300 for households containing a person aged 80 or over.135 In 2015–16 it was paid 
to 12.2 million individuals in over 8.7 million households.136 It cost DWP £2.1 billion.137
The Winter Fuel Payment and fuel poverty
75. The substantial recent improvements in pensioner incomes relative to working-age 
households we saw in Chapter 2 have been accompanied by falls in the proportion of 
pensioner households living in fuel poverty, as shown in Figure 19. In households whose 
youngest member is aged 60 and over the fuel poverty rate in England has halved in 
a decade, from 12 per cent in 2004 to 6 per cent in 2014. There has been a particularly 
large decrease among the over-75s. In the same period the fuel poverty rate among non-
130 Q37 [Steve Webb]
131 Q38 [Steve Webb]
132 HC Deb 14 November 1972 vol 846 c53W; DWP Abstract of Statistics
133 DWP Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2016
134 Labour 2015 General Election manifesto, p. 49; Liberal Democrat 2015 General Election manifesto, para 3.4. In 
2015 it was estimated that around 600,000 people of WFP qualifying age were higher-rate taxpayers (source: HL 
Deb 26 Jan 2015 Written question HL4131), around 5% of the relevant age group.
135 For full details of rates and eligibility see https://www.gov.uk/winter-fuel-payment/what-youll-get 
136 DWP, Winter Fuel Payment: recipient and household figures 2015 to 2016
137 DWP Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2016
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pensioner households has remained broadly the same. Now is an appropriate moment to 
examine the effect of the WFP on intergenerational fairness and whether its retention is 
warranted.
Figure 19: Households in fuel poverty, by age of youngest occupant, England, 2003–2014
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76. We heard concerns that abrupt reductions to the scope or value of universal pensioner 
benefits could undermine the substantial gains achieved in alleviating pensioner poverty. 
The Pensions Policy Institute pointed out:
Relatively small changes in pensioner incomes such as changes to universal 
benefits [ … ] can have significant impacts on poverty rates. There is a high 
concentration of 1.2 million older adults with incomes only just above the 
poverty level, the biggest group of people in the UK living on the brink of 
poverty.138
Other witnesses told us that the provision of universal benefits to pensioners helps to save 
money elsewhere in the system, notably in the NHS and social care budgets.139
77. Neil Duncan-Jordan of the National Pensioners’ Convention defended the WFP and 
other universal pensioner benefits as a means of making up the historically inadequate 
level of the state pension:
You have to look at why we’ve got a lot of these things in the first place. We’ve 
got a lot of these additional universal benefits because our state pension is 
138 Pensions Policy Institute (IGF0055)
139 For example, Age UK (IGF0044), National Pensioners Convention (IGF0034), Independent Age (IGF0048) and 
For Richer, For Poorer? A review of the evidence on universal pensioner benefits, Independent Age/ Strategic 
Society Centre research report, 2015
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widely regarded as inadequate. I mean, £115 a week after paying in 30 or 40 
years’ national insurance is not a huge amount of money on the basic state 
pension.140
Age UK and Later Life Ambitions, a campaigning group, warned that many pensioner 
households on low incomes might not apply for a means tested WFP.141 Around one third 
of households entitled to mean tested Pension Credit do not claim it.142
78. The level of the WFP is not connected to fuel costs experienced by households. There 
is evidence, however, that its label as a fuel payment is effective in prompting households 
to use it to heat their homes. The IFS estimated that pensioner households spend 47% of 
their WFP on fuel compared to 3% if they treated the payment purely as cash.143
79. Ashley Seager told us, however, that affluent pensioners did not tend to spend the 
WFP on fuel:
I met a wealthy pensioner the other day, who said, ‘Me and my friends love it 
when the winter fuel allowance comes in. We book London’s top restaurant 
and go for a massive splash-up meal.’ Is that an appropriate use of public 
resources at a time when we are borrowing £80 billion or £90 billion a year 
[ … ]?144
Shiv Malik concurred, arguing that recent improvements in pensioner incomes meant 
that the universal WFP should have been one of the first targets for fiscal savings:
We have a very set image of what pensioners are like, which is that presumably 
they are all very poor and deprived. That used to be true. It just isn’t true 
now. [ … ] So why do they need £2.3 billion in winter fuel payments when 
[ … ] it does not go to fuel? People spend it on whatever they like, whether 
it be claret or something of far more necessity. [ … ] Why on earth then, if 
you are cutting, would you cut the education maintenance allowance or the 
future jobs fund before you cut winter fuel payment?145
80. The Winter Fuel Payment is a universal benefit that is not focused on those who 
need it most. It is a blunt instrument for alleviating fuel poverty among the least well-
off pensioner households and gives a cash payment to many households who do not 
need it. As its value is fixed in cash terms its real value is set to dwindle gradually over 
time.
140 Q101 [Neil Duncan-Jordan]
141 Age UK (IGF0044) para 22 and Later Life Ambitions (IGF0043), para 8
142 DWP Income-related benefits: estimates of take-up: financial year 2014/15 table PC5
143 Beatty et al, “Cash by any other name? Evidence on labeling from the UK Winter Fuel Payment,” Journal of 
Public Economics, Volume 118, October 2014, pp. 86–96, cited in Institute for Fiscal Studies (IGF0023)
144 Q100 [Ashley Seager]
145 Q252 [Shiv Malik]
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Policy options
81. The Intergenerational Foundation said the WFP should be means tested, arguing 
that its universality will “result in increasing unfairness and inefficiency as the wealthy 
members of the baby boomer generation retire.”146 We considered various options for 
restricting its payment [latest estimate of annual savings in brackets]:
• restrict to Pension Credit recipients only [£1.5 billion];147
• progressively withdraw from pensioners with incomes above the national 
average salary [uncosted]; 148
• treat it as taxable income [£250 million];149 and
• remove from higher rate taxpayers [£105 million].150
82. These measures would at best only save just over 1 per cent of total social security 
expenditure on pensioners.151 The estimated savings do not take account of any increase 
in administrative costs or complexity that may arise from means testing or taxing the 
benefit. Ashley Seager argued that these factors should not be an obstacle to means testing:
the argument is lazy that it is too difficult and too expensive to means test 
for pensioners when we means test for every other sector of the population.152
83. Neil Duncan-Jordan told us that “means testing would be inefficient and expensive, 
and it probably would miss some of those who need the help most.”153 Steve Webb raised 
practical objections to making WFP taxable:
If you only try to get money off higher rate taxpaying pensioners on the 
winter fuel payment, there is a risk you will spend more money administering 
it than you will raise. There are just so few higher rate taxpaying pensioners. 
That may change over time, but you only get money if you tax all taxpayers, 
which is half of pensioners. Even then it is not as simple as it looks, because 
we pay winter fuel payments to households and we tax individuals.154
84. Steve Webb added that the Winter Fuel Payment as Governments have tended not to 
uprate it in cash terms its real value was progressively dwindling:
The winter fuel payment is £2 billion or whatever, that is not quite yet a 
rounding error in the DWP, but because it is never going to be increased it 
will become a rounding error. If we are going to focus on it, let us focus on 
the £100 billion we spend on the pension, not the bits on the side.155
146 Intergenerational Foundation (IGF0010)
147 HC Deb 13 December 2011 col 704w
148 Intergenerational Foundation (IGF0010)
149 PQ HL4133 [on Winter Fuel Payments], 26 January 2015
150 HC Deb 21 May 2013 col 675w
151 Based on total GB pension-age expenditure of £115.6 billion in 2016–17, from DWP Benefit expenditure and 
caseload tables 2016
152 Q99 [Ashley Seager]
153 Q104 [Neil Duncan-Jordan]
154 Q42 [Steve Webb]
155 Q88 [Steve Webb]
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Neil Duncan-Jordan told us that, when first introduced, the WFP was worth “about a 
third” of the average fuel bill. It has since fallen to “about an eighth”. He argued that “it 
was cut by the last Government. It hasn’t kept pace [with inflation] because it is not linked 
to anything”.156
85. Expenditure on the WFP is falling in real terms as its value is not uprated and the 
age of eligibility is rising in line with state pension age. In 2016–17 prices the amount 
spent on WFP has fallen from £2.3 billion in 2011–12 to £2.1 billion in 2016–17 and is 
forecast to fall further to £1.8 billion by 2020–21.157 Beyond 2021, the overall number of 
recipients will rise, as will the proportion of recipients who qualify for the higher rate of 
payment (for those aged 80 and over). However, as demonstrated by Figure 20, the absence 
of uprating is likely to prevent total expenditure rising in real terms in the long run.
Figure 20: Winter Fuel Payment expenditure, Great Britain
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payment: long-term CPI assumed to be constant 2%
If the WFP were to remain frozen in cash terms in perpetuity, its real-terms value will be 
eroded by a third over the next 20 years and by a half over the next 35 years.158
86. Successive Governments from both main parties have introduced universal 
benefits for pensioners, who have a high propensity to vote, for reasons of short-term 
expediency. As these benefits are not subject to indexation promises their value withers 
away in real terms, but their symbolic and political importance is more durable. Such 
measures lead to ill-targeted support, further complicate the benefits system and 
are far harder to put right than to introduce in the first place. Given the welcome 
improvements in pensioner incomes and reductions in pensioner poverty seen in 
recent years, there is no case for future governments to contemplate any increase in 
the value or range of universal pensioner benefits.
156 Q103 [Neil Duncan-Jordan]
157 DWP Benefit Expenditure and caseload tables 2016
158 Based on CPI inflation of 2 per cent per annum.
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87. The longer universal pension benefits remain protected, the more they may come 
to be viewed as integral entitlements. Their relatively recent introduction, however, 
means they should not be seen as sacrosanct elements of the welfare settlement that 
beneficiaries have paid for during their working lives. Universal pensioner benefits 
should not be off limits when spending priorities are set in future Parliaments.
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5 Strengthening the intergenerational 
contract
Intergenerational fairness and policy-making
88. Growing concerns about the intergenerational contract make it vital that policy-
making incorporates consideration of intergenerational fairness. Information is key 
to this. We heard, however, that such information is scant. This could contribute to 
intergenerational concerns being overlooked. Professor James Sefton told us:
I think there is an awareness of intergenerational sharing. [ … ] I think 
what is lacking is a conversation and figures to base that around. We don’t 
understand exactly what the amounts are, what the key factors are, how 
they interact, how the Government sector interacts with the private sector 
and what the key areas are. [ … ] We need to get the figures out there first 
to get the discussion going.159
89. Michael Johnson called for new legislation to be accompanied by “intergenerational 
impact assessments” which would “express in cash flow terms the impact on the burden 
of taxation in the future”.160 This, he argued, would:
introduce at the heart of the legislative process some way of bringing to the 
surface the cash flow or tax burden consequences of the future generation 
of the promises that we are making to ourselves today.161
90. As noted in Chapter 2, there is no up to date and comprehensive analysis—historic or 
prospective—of intergenerational redistribution over the whole lifecycle.162 The Academy 
of Social Sciences highlighted the gaps in our knowledge in this area:
We lack a full or even partial set of age-specific accounts that include 
not just cash receipts by age groups through social benefits but the age 
breakdown of public services. Recent analyses focus on pensioner benefits 
but neglect social care (where austerity has cut places). Such accounts would 
need to include the recent expansion of student loans, both as a benefit 
and a liability as well as policies (such as apprenticeships and the national 
minimum wage) where the direct cost is being moved out of public spending 
to company balance sheets.163
91. In Chapter 2 we cited the hugely valuable research conducted by Professor John Hills 
which estimated the intergenerational distribution of social protection expenditure and 
receipts over lifetimes.164 The research is now more than a decade old and was based on 
even older data. It does not, therefore, take account of economic trends and policy changes 
in the interim period.
159 Q268 [James Sefton]
160 Q213 [Michael Johnson]
161 Q213 [Michael Johnson]
162 Q276 [James Sefton]
163 Academy of Social Sciences (IGF0032)
164 John Hills, ‘Distribution and redistribution’, chapter 8 in Inequality and the State, OUP, 2004; analysis 
reproduced in John Hills, Good Times Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us, Policy Press, 2015 ch 13 fig 
3.13.
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92. Ashley Seager described this kind of generational lifecycle analysis as “an enormous 
undertaking that does need to be done”, but which the Intergenerational Foundation has 
not yet been able to attempt.165 Professor Sefton provided us with an overview of the 
range of administrative and survey data sources that could be drawn upon to develop a 
life-cycle analysis not just of net fiscal contribution by different cohorts, but potentially 
encompassing private economic transfers between generations.166
93. There is a dearth of reliable and comprehensive information about the 
intergenerational distribution of public and private resources. Greater awareness 
of the intergenerational implications of decisions would make for better policy. 
We recommend the Government make available the necessary information and 
resources to enable updated research estimating the balance of fiscal contributions and 
withdrawals by different generations over their entire lifetimes to be carried out. We 
further recommend the Government undertake a forward-looking assessment of the 
intergenerational distribution of private income and wealth.
Securing the intergenerational contract
94. We heard cautionary evidence that the experiences of successive generations should 
not be solely reduced to net financial transfers. Both the Academy of Social Sciences and 
the IFS noted that today’s young benefit from improvements in areas such as healthcare 
and technology that were not available to their forebears.167 Later Life Ambitions told us:
No two generations have the same experience–technology, the vagaries 
of history, changing economic circumstances all shape a generation’s 
experience. Nobody would advocate rationing for today’s children because 
it would only be fair to those who were children during the Second World 
War any more than they would suggest students who enjoyed grants in the 
1960s return them to the state as a courtesy to young people paying student 
fees.168
Saga pointed to the “dour” living conditions of the post-War period, in which “mobile 
phones and computers were effectively science fiction”. By contrast, young people today 
could enjoy central heating, household appliances and “a kaleidoscope of entertainment 
available inside and outside the home”. The society enjoyed by the young had been 
“endowed to them by those working generations before them”.169
95. Nevertheless, the intergenerational fairness debate risks becoming characterised as 
a battle between generations. Major books on the subject have set out to show “How the 
Baby Boomers Took Their Children’s Future - And Why They Should Give it Back” and 
“How Britain Bankrupted Its Youth”.170 Baroness Altmann told us that she was:
165 Qq 78–79 [Ashley Seager]
166 Professor James Sefton (IGF 0075)
167 Academy of Social Sciences (IGF0032); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IGF0023)
168 Later Life Ambitions (IGF0043)
169 Saga (IGF0069)
170 David Willetts, The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children’s Future – and Why They Should Give It 
Back, 2010 (2010); Ed Howker and Shiv Malik, Jilted Generation: How Britain Has Bankrupted Its Youth (2010)
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quite exercised by the undercurrent of intergenerational conflict that seems 
to have grown up over recent times, and we are in a society in which we 
want intergenerational cohesion.171
The National Pensioners Convention warned against “creating a division between young 
and old and encouraging a phoney war between the generations”.172 We even heard 
suspicions that the intergenerational fairness debate is intended to drive a “race to the 
bottom”, pitting young and old in a contest for resources whereby difficulties encountered 
by one group are used as a reason to cut entitlements for others.173
96. We began this Report looking at polling evidence of intergenerational concern. Lord 
Willetts explained:
Pensioners do now worry about their kids or grandkids [ … ] younger 
people do not resent money going to their granny. The polling on that is 
quite interesting. Younger people are tougher on working-age benefits than 
they are on pensioner benefits.174
Independent Age, a charity, pointed out “the lack of statistical evidence of intergenerational 
resentment of any kind.”175 A 2013 report by Demos, a think tank, assessed generational 
attitudes to the welfare state using survey data and focus groups and found “a remarkable 
degree of cross-generational solidarity”. The priorities of different generations for public 
spending were motivated not by generational self-interest but by a common desire for the 
system to support those most in need and to honour the contributions that older people 
made throughout their working lives”.176 These findings were echoed by the ‘Citizens’ Jury’ 
convened earlier this year by PwC, a professional services firm, to look at intergenerational 
fairness:
The jury was clear that a problem for one generation is also a problem 
for another: younger generations are concerned about issues that would 
adversely affect their parents and grandparents, while older generations 
worry deeply about the challenges for their dependents. They were clear that 
all generations need to take responsibility for addressing intergenerational 
differences.177
97. A recurring theme of our evidence was “fault” and “blame”. Witnesses told us that 
baby boomers were being blamed for the difficulties younger people face in the housing 
market, simply because they happened to buy houses that appreciated markedly in value.178 
We agree with the National Pensioners Convention that any such an assertion is nonsense.179 
We also agree, however, with the Intergenerational Foundation that though baby boomers 
are not to blame, they did enjoy advantages that are not on offer to their successors.180 
171 Q292 [Baroness Altmann]
172 National Pensioners Convention (IGF0034)
173 Professor John Macnicol (IGF0020), GIPSIL (IGF0016), Unite the Union (IGF0030)
174 Q45 [Lord Willetts]
175 Independent Age (IGF0048)
176 Duffy et al, Generation Strains, Demos/Ipsos MORI, 9 September 2013
177 Intergenerational fairness - a citizens’ view, PwC/Britain Thinks, February 2016
178 For example Professor John Macnicol (IGF0020); Dr Jay Ginn (IGF0028); National Pensioners Convention 
(IGF0034).
179 Q82 [Neil Duncan-Jordan]
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We concur with the Beth Johnson Foundation, a charity, that it is necessary “to change 
the rhetoric from a ‘blaming game’ into a real intergenerational conversationgenerations 
working together to solve any issues that exist, not pitting them against one another”.181
98. Our current focus on imbalances between generations should not detract from the 
important issue of disparities of wealth and opportunity within each generation. The 
generational perspective is one of many that need to be considered in the formulation 
of policy to ensure a cohesive society that works for everyone.
99. The intergenerational fairness debate should not be conducted in divisive or 
adversarial terms. We reject any notion of intergenerational conflict and do not accuse 
any particular generation of stealing from their successors. Baby boomers acknowledge 
the pressures faced by later generations. They are concerned for their children’s and 
grandchildren’s prospects and already provide support where they can. In turn, 
younger people are concerned for the welfare of their parents and grandparents and 
want to ensure they enjoy a decent retirement. It is not the fault of baby boomers that 
the economy has become skewed in their favour. But the absence of fault does not 
obviate the need for policy action. The recommendations in this report are intended to 
strengthen the contract between generations that is at the heart of our society.
181 Beth Johnson Foundation (IGF0025)
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Conclusions and recommendations
The intergenerational contract under strain
1. Demographic trends have placed considerable stress on the intergenerational 
contract. The post-war baby boomer cohort entering retirement is particularly large 
and people within it will tend to enjoy longer retirements than was anticipated. 
This puts a strain on the working age population. Increases in the state pension age 
reduce the ratio of pensioners to working age people and therefore have counteracted 
demographic trends. For many people, however, working into their late sixties or 
seventies is not an option. (Paragraph 14)
2. Housing is central to intergenerational fairness. Rapid and sustained rises in house 
prices, most marked in London and its surrounding areas, have concentrated wealth 
in the hands of those who have owned property for decades. At the same time far 
too many young people have been priced out of homeownership. High private rents 
make it difficult to save for a deposit. The opportunities that were open to baby 
boomers to buy a home with a relatively small deposit are closed to today’s young. 
Though wealth will be passed to younger people through inheritance, this risks 
exacerbating inequality within generations. Successive governments have palpably 
failed to act effectively on the housing market. Alongside housebuilding, there is a 
strong case to consider innovative policies to encourage downsizing and to more 
efficiently distribute the existing stock. Such measures lie outside our remit. The 
manifest problems in the housing market, however, form the backdrop to much of 
this Report. (Paragraph 22)
3. More work is required to assess the intergenerational distribution of tax contributions 
and public spending on services and benefits. What research exists suggests that 
today’s young will be net contributors to the welfare state, while the baby boomer 
generation will be net beneficiaries. The effect is likely to have been exacerbated 
by policy decisions to protect pensioner benefits while targeting welfare cuts on 
working age payments. The limits of that approach have been reached. If further 
measures are needed to ensure the fiscal sustainability of welfare spending in the 
medium to long term then pensioner expenditure should not remain out of bounds. 
(Paragraph 36)
4. Great strides against the scourge of pensioner poverty have been made over the 
past 25 years. After housing costs, pensioner households are far less likely to be in 
poverty than households of working age, particularly those with children. Pensioner 
incomes have also rapidly caught up those of other households. This is a triumph. 
This success, however, has implications for policy. This is particularly true at a time 
when people in their 20s and 30s may struggle to attain—never mind exceed—the 
incomes of their forebears. (Paragraph 41)
5. The economy has become skewed in favour of baby boomers and against millennials. 
Unless governments adapt to these changed circumstances the intergenerational 
contract that underpins the welfare state is under threat. (Paragraph 42)
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The pension state triple lock
6. The triple lock, allied to the introduction of the flat rate new state pension, has 
succeeded in increasing the value of the headline state pension relative to average 
earnings to a level not seen since the original earnings link was removed in 1980. 
Low rates of earnings growth following the 2008–09 recession mean this process has 
occurred faster than was expected. Provided the new state pension is maintained at 
this proportion of earnings the work of the triple lock, to secure a decent minimum 
income for people in retirement to underpin private saving, will have been achieved. 
(Paragraph 48)
7. The triple lock is inherently unsustainable. In the absence of reform the state pension 
would inevitably grow at a faster rate than the rewards of work and would account 
for an ever-greater share of national income. In particular, we find no objective 
justification for the 2.5 per cent minimum increase. (Paragraph 54)
8. There is, to some extent, a trade-off between the uprating of the state pension and 
the state pension age. The cost of a more generous state pension can be offset by 
restricting its availability to fewer people. Increases in the state pension age, however, 
disproportionately affect younger people. They also risk further skewing receipt 
of the state pension towards people in areas of the country, and socio-economic 
groups, in which life expectancy is high. People with low life expectancies, who may 
have been disadvantaged in their early years and working lives, would be further 
disadvantaged in their later years. We do not doubt that further increases in the 
state pension age will be required as welcome increases in life expectancy continue. 
They should not, however, be the sole means of ensuring the long-term affordability 
of the state pension. We welcome the wide-ranging approach the ongoing review of 
the state pension age has taken to its work. (Paragraph 60)
9. The triple lock should not continue beyond 2020. By then, the value of the new state 
pension relative to average earnings will be close to the historic high for the headline 
state pension rate. If maintained, the arbitrary boost the triple lock gives to the 
state pension relative to both earnings and prices will become ever harder to justify 
both in fiscal terms and from the perspective of intergenerational fairness. We urge 
political consensus before the next general election on a new earnings link for the 
state pension. (Paragraph 67)
10. We recommend the Government benchmark the new state pension and basic state 
pension at the levels relative to average full-time earnings they reach in 2020. The 
triple lock should then be replaced by an earnings link. In periods when earnings 
lag behind price inflation, an above-earnings increase should be applied to protect 
pensioners against a reduction in the purchasing power of their state pension. Price 
indexation should continue when real earnings growth resumes until the state 
pension reverts to its benchmark proportion of average earnings. Such a mechanism 
would enable pensioners to continue to share in the proceeds of economic growth, 
protect the state pension against inflation and ensure a firm foundation for private 
retirement saving. The new state pension and basic state pension it replaced would 
track average earnings growth in the long term. That is more fiscally sustainable and 
more intergenerationally fair. (Paragraph 68)
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Universal pensioner benefits
11. The Winter Fuel Payment is a universal benefit that is not focused on those who 
need it most. It is a blunt instrument for alleviating fuel poverty among the least 
well-off pensioner households and gives a cash payment to many households who 
do not need it. As its value is fixed in cash terms its real value is set to dwindle 
gradually over time. (Paragraph 80)
12. Successive Governments from both main parties have introduced universal benefits 
for pensioners, who have a high propensity to vote, for reasons of short-term 
expediency. As these benefits are not subject to indexation promises their value 
withers away in real terms, but their symbolic and political importance is more 
durable. Such measures lead to ill-targeted support, further complicate the benefits 
system and are far harder to put right than to introduce in the first place. Given the 
welcome improvements in pensioner incomes and reductions in pensioner poverty 
seen in recent years, there is no case for future governments to contemplate any 
increase in the value or range of universal pensioner benefits. (Paragraph 86)
13. The longer universal pension benefits remain protected, the more they may come 
to be viewed as integral entitlements. Their relatively recent introduction, however, 
means they should not be seen as sacrosanct elements of the welfare settlement that 
beneficiaries have paid for during their working lives. Universal pensioner benefits 
should not be off limits when spending priorities are set in future Parliaments. 
(Paragraph 87)
Strengthening the intergenerational contract
14. There is a dearth of reliable and comprehensive information about the 
intergenerational distribution of public and private resources. Greater awareness 
of the intergenerational implications of decisions would make for better policy. 
We recommend the Government make available the necessary information and 
resources to enable updated research estimating the balance of fiscal contributions 
and withdrawals by different generations over their entire lifetimes to be carried out. 
We further recommend the Government undertake a forward-looking assessment of 
the intergenerational distribution of private income and wealth. (Paragraph 93)
15. Our current focus on imbalances between generations should not detract from the 
important issue of disparities of wealth and opportunity within each generation. The 
generational perspective is one of many that need to be considered in the formulation 
of policy to ensure a cohesive society that works for everyone. (Paragraph 98)
16. The intergenerational fairness debate should not be conducted in divisive or 
adversarial terms. We reject any notion of intergenerational conflict and do not 
accuse any particular generation of stealing from their successors. Baby boomers 
acknowledge the pressures faced by later generations. They are concerned for their 
children’s and grandchildren’s prospects and already provide support where they 
can. In turn, younger people are concerned for the welfare of their parents and 
grandparents and want to ensure they enjoy a decent retirement. It is not the fault of 
baby boomers that the economy has become skewed in their favour. But the absence 
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of fault does not obviate the need for policy action. The recommendations in this 
report are intended to strengthen the contract between generations that is at the 
heart of our society. (Paragraph 99)
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